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Too Soon to Say
EDWARD JAMES

Abstract
(1) Rupert Read charges that Rawls culpably overlooks the politicized Euthyphro: Do
we accept our political perspective because it is right or is it right because we accept
it? (2) This charge brings up the question of the deficiency dilemma: Do others disagree with us because of our failures or theirs? – where the two dilemmas appear to be
independent of each other and lead to the questions of the logic of deficiency, moral
epistemic deficiency, epistemic peers, and the hardness of philosophy. (3) In reply, on
an expanded principle of charity Rawls does not overlook the Euthyphro but rather
offers ground-breaking solutions to it, (4) that nonetheless trip on the independent
bootstrap (5) – as also do Dreben and Nussbaum. (6) Furthermore, Rawls’s
‘burdens of judgment’ seek to bypass the necessity of moral epistemic deficiency
and (7) suggest a wider framework for understanding disagreement that sees disagreement as arising from inquiry being in development, unpredictable and uncertain. (8) This wider framework entails that disagreement does not mean moral
epistemic deficiency and (9) that our responses to the Euthyphro are ‘too soon to say’.

1. Read on Rawls
In a recent essay1 Rupert Read charges that Rawls is culpably ignorant of what I will call the politicized Euthyphro (Euthyphro for short):
Do we accept our political perspective because it is right or is it right
because we accept it? Read accuses Rawls of aiming to justify in his
Theory of Justice (TJ) a conception of justice based on the original
contract, yet failing to answer whether the contract is just because
the contractors chose it or whether they chose it because it is just.
To reply, ‘Because the contractors chose it’ is to rest on a cultural
commitment and hence to fail as a theoretical justification. To
reply ‘Because it is just’ is to require a justification – a justification
Read does not find. Nor, Read continues, does the later Rawls of
Political Liberalism (PL) improve his position by seeking an overlapping consensus among competing comprehensive doctrines on being
R. Read, ‘On Philosophy’s Lack of Progress from Plato to
Wittgenstein (and Rawls)’, Philosophy 85 (2010), 341–367. All references
to Read are to this work. The emphases are Read’s.
1
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reasonable – on showing a mutual respect for each other’s views. For
that, too, is subject to the Euthyphro’s challenge: ‘Is the overlapping
consensus just because it’s an overlapping consensus, or is it an overlapping consensus because it’s just?’
Read then outlines his own answer to the Euthyphro, one that
abjures any universal ground of ‘“public reason” or what-have-you’
(367), which would lead to a philosophy ‘deformed by scientistic ambition’ (343). Rather, Read looks for an ‘alternative to seeking an
“overlapping consensus”’(361), an alternative that would ‘find an explicit comprehensive doctrine that as many of us as possible can sign
up to, as un-partial a comprehensive doctrine as possible’ (361). What
Read then finds is a doctrine that advocates ‘our human- and animaland living-oneness with one another, with future generations, and
with the planetary ecosystem itself, [which] is such as to demand systematic and impactful conscientious objection to war and to ecologically-deleterious activities … [and to] not be satisfied to privatise our
spirituality’ (357). From such a perspective, moreover, Rawls’s position would ‘appear not so much unattractive or false as absurd’ (365),
where, in a crescendo, it would have been ‘better if’ Rawls’s work ‘had
never been written’, for it did ‘not advance matters at all, but rather
[made] things worse’ (367).
Read’s scathing judgment of Rawls’s work, moreover, leads him to
answer the deficiency dilemma – Do others disagree with us because of
our failures or theirs? – with regard to Rawls by in effect accusing
Rawls of what I will call moral epistemic deficiency (MED) – as
guilty of being either perverse, careless of the truth or caught in the
self-deceit of culpable ignorance, or evil, clearly apprehending the
truth and willfully denying it.2 For starters, Read sees Rawls as
throughout guilty of ‘the illusion of scientism’ and ensnared by a
project ‘deformed by scientistic ambition’, that ‘dangerously (and,
some might even suggest, more or less deliberately?) masks its real intention; namely, the rhetorical promulgation of and an obscuring
apologia for a specific vision of society’ (343). And worse: ‘The
later Rawls repeats the ruse of the early Rawls’ (361), but ‘is more
confused in this regard than his early philosophy’ (362). In neither
case, in early or later Rawls, is there any argument but an ‘illusion
For an analysis of ‘epistemological carelessness’, see Harry Frankfurt,
On Bullshit (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005). For an
analysis of the perverse and the evil, see my ‘Going Astray: Weakness,
Perversity, or Evil?’ in Leroy S. Rouner (ed.), ‘On Selfhood’, Boston
University Series in Philosophy and Religion 12 (South Bend, Indiana:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), 73–92.
2
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of justification’ (341) that seeks for an ‘“agreement” in the “form of
life” that is liberal individualism’, an individualism ‘of rigidly autonomous selves, opaque to one another, but having interests and preferences that make them above all desiring-machines’ (364–365). In
sum, ‘his wish to come up with a “theory” … ensures that on the
most fundamental issue of his entire work, he shows less wisdom
and produces less clarity than was already present in Plato’s
Euthyphro. He succeeds only in pushing moral (and political) philosophy back to a stage inferior to that which it reached with Socrates’
(366). Finally, Read expands his judgment on Rawls to a general condemnation of liberalism and liberals, where ‘Rawls has been in this
paper merely an example, and the ramifications of this paper
stretch far, across most of liberalism’ (366).
2. The logic of deficiency
Seeing the other as guilty of MED is built on the logic of deficiency, a
logic ruling out options that might, in a nicer way, account for them,
those in disagreement with us. In general they can be seen neither as
innocently ignorant, not yet adequately informed of what is the case,
nor as innocently myopic, overly focused on one aspect of the situation, and so, in either option, needing education – not with sustained
attempts like that of Read’s to educate or persuade them. Nor can they
be seen as stupid or deranged, and so unable to know what is the case,
and thus requiring pity – not given their many achievements. Nor
can they be seen as just different, living in different worlds –
Wittgenstein’s lions who speak – and so calling for our indifference.
For any such indifference is forbidden by the common threats that
beset us and the common world we share. With these options ruled
out, why not see them as guilty of MED – as perverse: as deluded, deformed; or even as evil: as deliberately masking one’s true aims in a systematic ruse?
One reason not to accuse them, those others, of MED is found in the
notion of an epistemic peer, one who, to quote Audi, ‘is as rational and
thoughtful as oneself in the relevant matter and has considered the
same relevant evidence equally conscientiously’.3 Read, as his excoriations make amply clear, rejects with disdain the idea that Rawls and
like-minded liberals are ‘as rational and as thoughtful’ as himself.
Robert Audi, ‘The Ethics of Belief and the Morality of Action:
Intellectual Responsibility and Rational Disagreement’, Philosophy 86
(2011), 18.
3
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And he does so with reason. To Read, the differences between him
and a Rawls is not over some specific claim, p, which Audi considers,4
but encompasses whole ways of life (364–366). We find ourselves enmeshed in and divided by philosophical issues, competing philosophies – perspectives, comprehensive doctrines – namely, divergent
nets of interconnected beliefs on the facts, the legitimate questions,
the proper methodologies to answer the questions, and the structure
of proper answers.5 Nor, then, can philosophical disagreement be understood merely in terms of competing background assumptions,
since the competing alternative perspectives provide the ‘ur-background’ for any background assumptions by addressing the question
of what constitutes a good reason when what is in question is what a
good reason is. Hence, in a disagreement between a Rawls and a Read,
Audi’s notion of an epistemic peer doesn’t apply just because its defining criteria – rationality, thoughtfulness, relevant evidence, and
conscientious consideration – are all perspectivally defined and so
sharply vary from one philosophical perspective to another. As a
result, even if we did confine ourselves to a specific perspective in
our definition of an epistemic peer, that perspective would in its
turn be questioned and rejected by the adherents of competing perspectives, thus questioning whether those who disagree with our
theory of disagreement are epistemic peers and so are, plausibly,
guilty of MED – the paradox of theories of disagreement.
Another way to avoid accusing others of MED is to observe that
what we are doing in philosophy is hard. Just how it is hard,
however, is, indeed, hard to pin down. For it’s not hard by being
complex, inasmuch as the concept of complexity entails pieces that
can be put together, albeit with difficulty, through a specific
method, where we know what the end point, the proper answer,
looks like – as in a Rubik’s cube or a Kuhnian normal-science
puzzle. But in philosophy, to repeat, we disagree on ‘whole ways of
life’, on what a ‘good reason’ is, what the pieces are, what a successful
putting together might mean, and how to go about doing this. Our
4

Audi gives very few examples of propositions that we disagree on. He
primarily generalizes on the symbolic and singular proposition, p, and,
when he gives examples of p, he offers specific empirical claims, e.g. that a
branch fell in the wind (15), that a person is innocent (23) and a fact in astronomy (28).
5
While I confine myself in this essay to the specific discipline of philosophy, this understanding of philosophy underscores how philosophy is
found in all of the disciplines, from physics to psychology, insofar, for instance, as they all must question what epistemic status their respective
claims represent.
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‘reason’ and ‘methodologies’ are questioned in many and diverse ways;
our ‘pieces’ are fluid, inchoate; and our ‘conclusions’ are convoluted.
Yet such terms are vague, calling for a deeper account.
In this essay I will attempt to provide that deeper account – to
unpack such terms as fluid, inchoate, convoluted as applied to our
reasoning endeavors – and to outline an idea of the epistemic peer
that avoids the paradox of theories of disagreement. I will start by
arguing that Rawls in effect saw the politicized Euthyphro as a false
dilemma and offered two ground-breaking yes-yes replies to it – in
TJ and PL. These replies in turn point the way to a more comprehensive too-soon-to-say solution to the Euthyphro through deepening
Rawls’s concept of the ‘burdens of judgment’ into an understanding
of inquiry that illuminates how those who disagree with us need not
be guilty of MED. Hence, the replies to the essay’s two dilemmas
prove to be not independent of each other but conceptually
connected.
3. Rawls’s yes-yes reply to the Euthyphro
On an expanded principle of charity – where we give the strongest
possible interpretation of a thinker in the light of the language and
setting of that thinker6 – I follow Anthony Simon Laden’s rational reconstruction of Rawls and take him as seeing the grounding of anything, even one with a ready-made orientation like democracy, as
extremely difficult. Instead of seeing Rawls (as Read does) in terms
of what Laden calls ‘the standard blueprint’, where he is developing
‘a grand philosophical project … a theory in the traditional sense … to
show the [universal] rationality of justice’, Laden sees Rawls’s aim to
be more restrained.7 For Laden, Rawls aims to solve the problem of
deep and divergent commitments, secular to sectarian, among
6

See Robert J. Fogelin, Philosophical Interpretations (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1992), where he argues that to ‘alethic charity’ – mostly
true by our lights – should be added respect for semantic competence, as understood by both local and global interpretations (3–4).
7
Anthony Simon Laden, ‘The House that Jack Built: Thirty Years of
Reading Rawls’, Ethics 113 (2003), 371. All citations to Laden will be to this
essay. See, too, Joshua Cohen, ‘For a Democratic Society’, in Samuel
Freeman (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Rawls (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2002), who takes Rawls to be ‘asking what
the most reasonable conception is for a democratic society, … [where] we
address a disagreement among people who all accept an understanding
of persons as equals but who dispute the implications of that
425
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citizens in a democracy. Rawls aims to address a ‘citizen of faith’ and
not try to ‘cover all of the troubling aspects of modern political life’
(371) but in effect to be satisfied with keeping the political and cooperative conversation going in a democracy.
With this in mind, a Rawlsean reply to Read might well start by addressing Read’s ire, from his ready use of words like ‘absurd’, which
makes argument impossible by placing the claims in question outside
the bounds of reason – as neither ‘unattractive’ nor ‘false’ – to his
better-never-to-have-been-born judgment of Rawls’s work itself.
How could the conversation progress with such excoriations as
these for starters? Rather, Rawls reasoned, we need to keep the conversation going by following Kant in seeking key principles grounded
in procedures of reasoning. But instead of Kant’s attempt to base the
procedures in universal Reason, for all, which Rawls did not take as
viable, he set them in prior commitments, for ‘us’ – those with a
prior commitment to democratic problem-solving. As Rawls puts
it, ‘not everything can be constructed and every construction has a
basis, certain materials, as it were, from which it begins’.8 What
makes Rawls ‘a great philosopher’, Laden argues, is ‘his ability to
see the full depth and complexity of even the narrowest of philosophical questions’. Hence, he is not begging the question by limiting
himself to citizens of liberal convictions – whether they are committed to fairness or reasonableness – as Read accuses Rawls of
merely ‘preaching to the choir’ (356). For, after Laden, it is ‘hard
… to even do that’ (381) – hard even to provide the choir with good
reasons.
Laden’s reconstruction of Rawls’s trajectory, consequently, illuminates how Rawls did not overlook the Euthyphro but saw it as a false
dilemma. He believed that justification must unite both conviction
and reason, and so he answers the Euthyprho through a two-step
yes-yes strategy. First, he takes it that we are in general agreement,
share a common ‘basis’: we believe – in TJ the ideal of fairness and
then in PL the ideal of reasonableness; and then, second, he argues
that such a basis frames a grounding of specific liberal claims – we

understanding’(88–89). Laden finds even this interpretation of Rawls to be
too broad – a cousinly disagreement I need not adjudicate in this essay.
8
John Rawls, ‘Themes in Kant’s Moral Philosophy’, in Samuel
Freeman (ed.), John Rawls: Collected Papers (Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Harvard University Press, 1999), 514. I was made aware of this through
Onora O’Neill’s essay, ‘Constructivism in Rawls and Kant’, in The
Cambridge Companion to Rawls, op. cit., note 7, 356.
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have reasons suggested by and directing our beliefs: in TJ through
reasoning directed by the framework of a fair contract and then in
PL through our own individual comprehensive doctrines responding
to the requirements of reasonableness. Moreover, Rawls would ask
Read how his search for an ‘unpartial’ explicit comprehensive doctrine is not self-defeating in our time. For the sharp differences and
passions that divide us – differences that Read’s passions and certainties both illustrate and exacerbate – render right now any such specific
unpartial comprehensive doctrine a practical impossibility. Rather,
Rawls argued, all comprehensive doctrines are partisan, so all we
could in the end hope for is a second-order commitment, a commitment to a vaguely defined reasonableness (in PL) that would keep the
democratic conversation going and that in turn would be more
specifically justified by our own partisan comprehensive doctrines.
Hence, while Rawls is preaching to the choir, he would view his
choir as far more polychoral than Read’s.
4. Rawls’s independent bootstraps
Nonetheless, while Rawls, contra Read, is not oblivious to the
Euthyphro, Rawls’s project faces serious difficulties in answering
the Euthyphro – and for reasons that Rawls himself, for TJ at least,
came to grant. For starters, it turns out, Rawls’s choir, namely,
those who were aligned with his liberalism, while not miniscule,
was nowhere near as polychoral as he took it to be. In Joshua
Cohen’s words, as aware of our deeply divergent commitments as
he was, Rawls nonetheless was ‘insufficiently attentive … to political
disagreement’.9 For what is deeply troubling in Rawls, and to some
extent explains Read’s ire, is not so much what he says as who he
leaves out. For Rawls’s stress on democratic problem-solving would,
albeit unintentionally, alienate those, like Read, who do not start
where Rawls starts and so feel left out of the discussion from the
get go. Moreover, and both ironically and more positively, many of
our philosophical disagreements became more sharply in focus in
no small degree because of Rawls’s great achievement. For catalyzed
by Rawls’s TJ, whole perspectives that had slumbered under positivism’s piecemeal analyses – Aristotelianism, libertarianism, feminism and on – awoke to reject Rawls’s liberalism. Their rejections in
turn made clear to Rawls that precisely because we are free and
equal people, even if we all initially accepted the justification of
9

Op. cit., note 7, 88.
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TJ’s liberal constitution, many of us would over time come to reject
it. That is, TJ’s bootstrap is independent, a bootstrap with a mind of its
own: its initial commitment to ‘free and equal citizens’ would guarantee that they, the free and equal citizens, would in their independence
be moved to reject both its highly specific constitution of justice-asfairness and also the justification for that constitution.10
This conclusion led Rawls to PL, in which he sought a yet more
inclusive level of commitment than his TJ’s bootstrap of fairness.
Rawls’s PL, to repeat, specifies that all legitimate comprehensive doctrines should accept and then justify the (bootstrap) ‘freestanding’
ideal of reasonableness on their own, out of their own inner doctrine.
But why should they do this? He cannot appeal here to the justification that he would have each come to give, for they have not yet given
it. Rather, he would have to rely on the justifications that the upholders of these many and diverse comprehensive doctrines would
on their own develop. But even if they initially recognized the freestanding value of reasonableness, they would, because of their very
freedom and equality, be moved by their own key doctrines to
espouse as politically central other contrary freestanding values – as
found in Aristotelian excellence, communitarianism, ecology,
Abrahamic mercy, …, market competition, …, Buddhist compassion,
… It’s not, to repeat, that Rawls’s justification is problematic because
it assumes a set of prior commitments, a bootstrap – as Read charges
(349). For Rawls would grant and indeed insist on this, both for TJ
and PL, as the first step in his yes-yes solution to the Euthyphro.
It’s rather that the solution dissolves itself by its own initial commitment, a bootstrap with an independent mind, one that would lead free
and equal people to reject reasonableness as the trump political value
precisely because they are freely and equally pursuing the central
ideas of their comprehensive doctrines.
5. Dreben and Nussbaum
Burton Dreben saw more clearly than most Rawls’s bootstrap strategy
and responded to critiques of it by insisting on the bootstrap: ‘Rawls is
a good enough thinker not to argue against those who do not believe in
liberal constitutional democracy.… The outcome of that struggle he
10

I have argued against Rawls’s TJ on similar (pluralistic) grounds in
past essays – especially in ‘A Reasoned Ethical Incoherence’ in Ethics 89
(1979), 240–243, and in ‘Butler, Fanaticism, and Conscience’, in
Philosophy 56 (1981), 517–532.
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takes for granted, just as I think any sensible person should today’.11
Armed with his conviction of being a sensible person – rooted in
liberal democracy – Dreben answers the deficiency question by
damning those who dare to disagree, insisting that there is no alternative. ‘What do you say to an Adolph Hitler? … You shoot him. …
Reason has no bearing on that question’ (328–329). It’s us, the sensible
ones, or Hitler! However, Dreben’s stark alternatives – us or Hitler –
underlines the independence of the bootstrap that is implicitly embodied in that extremely embracive ‘us’, the non-Hitlers, the ‘free and
equal thinkers’ who will opt for other principal political values –
Vedantic or Abrahamic or Buddhist or Confucian or Aristotelian,
…, a very long list indeed – just because we are ‘free and equal’.
Moreover, Dreben’s urgent insistence, like that of Read’s, raises
the question again of why there is so much ready animus (and in a logician to boot). One reply is that the animus appears to arise out of our
answers to the Euthyphro itself. For no matter which alternative to the
Euthyphro we take, whether we take our political perspective to be
based on justification or a cultural commitment or a form of life
grounding a cultural commitment, we seem led to passionately advocate our view over that of others. For if our philosophy is based on
justification, where we take our view to be objectively true or truer
than any other view, which ‘any sensible person’ should accept,
then we should strongly advocate that others see its superiority.
And if based on commitment, where we urge others to ‘sign up to’
one’s ‘unpartial comprehensive doctrine’, realizing that this is
nothing we can prove in a ‘scientistic’ fashion, then we should urge
others to accept our truth, the only ‘truth’ we recognize, so that we
are not removed from the power structures and can thus ensure that
our Weltbild will continue. Indeed, the more our perspective is
built on commitment, the more we seem forced to urgently
advance it. For if it is built on justification, we might hope that in
time truth will out. But if it is built on commitment, then we lack
the luxury of time and face the danger of being overcome – with its
consequent lack of funding and public support – by a rival perspective. Hence, Read’s studied disdain of Rawls and liberals and
Dreben’s willingness to call out dissenters as Nazis is a way of
getting us to see, to board their respective bandwagons. But such
Burton Dreben, ‘On Rawls and Political Liberalism’, in The
Cambridge Companion to Rawls, op. cit., note 7, 323. For a more partisan assertion of such a finality, see Francis Fukuyama’s declaration of ‘the end of
history as such’ in his The End of History and the Last Man (New York: The
Free Press, 1992), which he has, rightly, rejected in his later works.
11
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urgency only underscores a key question Rawls so much wanted to
answer, namely, How can we find a way of reasoning together rather
than shouting at each other?
In response to this question, and finessing Dreben’s ad baculum,
Martha Nussbaum bids us to see that all of us, mainline believers
and non-believers, are aware of ‘the condition of modernity, and …
can in fact accept Rawlsean political liberalism’ as embodied in the
trump ideal of ethical reasonableness – being respectful of others no
matter what they hold, provided the compliment is paid back in
turn.12 Our commitment, in other words, should be to allow each
to speak without being ridiculed or otherwise put down, provided
that the commitment is mutual. To do otherwise, in particular, to
favor any standard built on one’s idea of reason, leads to what she
‘would call “expressive subordination”, subordination that consists
in being publicly ranked beneath others’ (35). More specifically, to
say universally that argument is better than faith, that astronomy
trumps astrology, ‘is to denigrate students who are members of nonrationalist religions. [Teachers and the like] may certainly say that in
contexts where citizens of many different views debate about fundamental matters, rational argument is crucial. They may also recommend it as part and parcel of a particular enterprise, such as
scientific proof. But they should not say, “Live your life by reason
and not by faith”’ (39).
But this admonition would not tether the independent bootstraps
but rather would incite them even more to go their own way. For starters, Nussbaum’s claim that ‘rational argument is crucial’ in ‘fundamental matters’ raises the question as to what is fundamental. The
End Time? Abortion? The ‘nature’ of women? Economic distributions that can be observed by all? Such questions make clear that
Nussbaum’s seemingly sharp distinction between reason and faith
would only move each perspective within those two groups to insist
on its own independence, with its own brand of expressive subordination as defined by ‘true’ ‘freedom and equality’.13 Indeed, and on the
one hand, the explicit attempt to include the epistemically unreasonable under the banner of ethical reasonableness would drive away the
Martha C. Nussbaum, ‘Perfectionist Liberalism and Political
Liberalism’, in Philosophy and Public Affairs 39 (2011), 37. All references
to Nussbaum are to this essay. This essay made clear to me the distinction
and tension in Rawls between epistemic and ethical reasonableness.
13
Alasdair MacIntyre’s Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre
Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988) is a work that naturally comes to mind here.
12
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epistemically reasonable. For they could not honestly hold to ethical
reasonableness simply because it lacks a commitment to giving good
reasons – a commitment that is essential to being epistemically reasonable. To the epistemically reasonable, the idea of ethical reasonableness does not show how to continue the inquiry but stops it, cold –
even more so than disdain and ridicule. And, on the other hand,
many in the ranks of the epistemically unreasonable could not in
good faith accept ethical reasonableness, given their absolute textual
certitudes, but could accept it only as a modus vivendi, until they
gained sufficient power to force their ways on others.
Indeed, Rawls himself was implicitly worried about independent
bootstraps in TJ and justified its specificity to restrain such independence. This is a point that Nussbaum made me aware of in her observation that being ethically reasonable is ‘closely related to the Kantian
idea of treating humanity as an end … to the idea that humanity has
worth and not merely a price’ (18). Citing Rawls’s TJ (586), she
takes dignity to stand on its own: it ‘has little determinate content
which needs to be defined in connection with a group of other ideas
and principles’ (18, note 36). While Kantian in spirit it is not
Kantian in justification; rather, after Rawls, it is ‘a political, not a comprehensive, value’ (18). However, the passage from Rawls’s TJ that
Nussbaum cites highlights the independent bootstrap that PL’s ideal
of reasonableness faces. For in that passage Rawls judges that ‘the
notion of respect or of the inherent worth of persons is not a suitable
basis for arriving at these principles [of justice]. It is precisely these
ideas that call for interpretation’ through some such construction as
TJ that ‘enables us to understand and to assess these feelings about
the primacy of justice. Justice as fairness is the outcome: it articulates
these opinions and supports their general tendency’ (TJ, 586). That is,
left to itself, the ‘general tendency’ of the bootstrap ‘of respect or of the
inherent worth of persons’ independently and equally supports –
suggests, frames, encourages – a host of perspectives, from Vedanta
and on, each with its own ‘interpretation’ of what the ‘general tendency’ of this freestanding ideal requires. Hence, Rawls’s TJ caution
illuminates how each competing comprehensive doctrine would
come to provide a justification of why its freestanding ideal is the
trump political ideal and not Rawlsean reasonableness.
6. The burdens of judgment
Tellingly, Nussbaum acknowledges that ‘secular rationalists would
not agree’ with the ideal of ethical reasonableness. But she stands
431
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firm, in part moved by the ‘massive difficulty’ that follows from an
exclusive stress on epistemic reasonableness: any such stress would
exclude too many – not only the upholders of the ‘weirder doctrines’
like alien invasion, but also the more traditional and ‘familiar’ doctrines of the Trinity, grace, and mysticism – which are plagued by inconsistencies (26–27). Faced with this impasse, Nussbaum adds that
she is ‘not sure how to envisage the next stage of the argument here’
(39). What I would suggest is that we should follow Nussbaum’s
Rawlsean lead and try to include more in the conversation – by
being less ready to exclude those who live ‘by faith’ from the ranks
of the epistemically reasonable and being more alert to the weaknesses
of our own doctrines.
Here I am aided by Christopher Miles Coope’s recent reflection on
how a thinker like G.E.M. Anscombe challenges any easy understanding of being ‘epistemically reasonable’. Coope noted that
Anscombe denied that one could be a true Christian and come to
believe otherwise and also ridiculed Christian apologetics, the idea
that ‘religion was backed by a structure of argumentative consideration, available at least in outline to all, and which safely delivered
the correct outcome’.14 Yet she also asserted that, ‘rather generally,
it must be good for anyone to think, “Perhaps in some way I can’t
see … perhaps I am hopelessly wrong in some essential way”’
(262). And more, she throughout backed up her ideas, whether on
faith or on utility, by a frighteningly intense engagement with sustained and reasoned inquiry. ‘Hers was a dissent which disturbed
the peace not only intellectually but up to a point socially. She did
not fit in’, where, Coope cites Philippa Foot, ‘the last thing [many]
wanted was Elizabeth around’ (251). Anscombe would hardly have
rejected the idea of expressive subordination when it came to reasoning or ‘faith’ (263). Faced with the fact of an Anscombe, ‘a philosopher of the first rank … with an abrasive and unsettling world
view’ (251), Coope was led to doubt whether we ‘understand
enough about what it is to be rational’ (291) to make any easy distinction between the epistemically reasonable and the epistemically
unreasonable.
Rawls as well can be seen as reluctant to make any such easy distinction in his version of the hardness of philosophy. For he sees philosophy as hard in his notion of ‘the burdens of judgment’ – the many
‘sources, or causes, of disagreement between reasonable persons so
defined’(PL, 55): in brief, (a) conflicting and complex evidence, (b)
Christopher Miles Coope, ‘The Bad News of the Gospel’, Philosophy
86 (2011), 271.
14
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the varying weights we place on evidence, (c) vague concepts, (d) the
various ways our ‘total experience’ shapes our evaluations, (e) ‘different kinds of normative considerations’, and, (f) a necessarily restricted set of values defining ‘a limited social space’ (PL, 56–57).
Rawls merely lists the burdens, because he believes that to do otherwise, say, by proposing a theory of incommensurability after Berlin,
would be to offer a comprehensive doctrine of values that would only
divide us further (and in effect succumb to the paradox of theories of
disagreement). The fact alone of the burdens, what we all can acknowledge as essential constituents of our thinking endeavor itself,
Rawls holds, ‘suffices for our purposes simply to assert’ (PL note
10, 57). However, he does insist that the ‘account of these burdens
must be such that it is fully compatible with, and so does not
impugn, the reasonableness of those who disagree’ (PL, 55). That
is, and what is to be stressed, epistemic reasonableness and not
ethical reasonableness is essential to Rawls’s concept of the burdens
of judgment. For there would be no need for the burdens if all that
was at stake was an ethical reasonableness: we would then simply
‘respect’, i.e. not denigrate, whatever others held, provided that
‘respect’ was returned. What Rawls seeks through the burdens is a
way to include the epistemically reasonable by giving epistemic
respect to those we disagree with, where we need not accuse them
of being guilty of MED.
Yet, after making clear his aim, Rawls immediately asks, ‘What,
then, goes wrong?’ And, he answers, what goes wrong is found in
‘the many hazards involved in the correct (and conscientious) exercise
of our powers of reason and judgment in the ordinary course of political life’ (56), as we, to repeat, in divergent ways sift through and
weigh conflicting and complex evidence, demarcate vague concepts,
and so on. Thus, by seeing disagreement as raising the question of
who has gone wrong, the burdens open up the possibility not only
that something has gone wrong but also that someone has gone
wrong in negotiating those many hazards. Someone goes wrong,
first, in judging what is not so as so, or, second, in not making clear
to those who would listen what is so. As he reflected in PL, that
thinkers disagreed with him on TJ showed that someone was
somehow deficient, either them – libertarians, Thomists, feminists,
Confucians – for ‘not seeing the idea of the original position’ correctly
(PL, xxix), or himself, as he ‘underestimated the depth of the
problem of making Theory consistent’ (PL, xxx).
After a while, then, after one has patiently and repeatedly made
clear one’s ideas, what goes wrong must fall more and more on the
willful obtuseness of the other. That the road we are on has multiple
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hazards does not excuse us from falling into a ditch – not after a Rawls
has erected directional and warning signs. Hence, the burdens, paradoxically, do not prevent a Rawls in a principled way to refrain from
impugning the epistemic reasonableness of those who disagree with
him, as Rawls hoped. This failure of the burdens to avoid accusing
others of MED, on the one hand, supports Nussbaum’s arguments
for seeing Rawls as in the end prioritizing ethical over epistemic
reasonableness, which, on the other hand, comes with the high cost
of alienating precisely those whom we have a chance of communicating with – the epistemically reasonable.
7. The practice of inquiry
So, our problem is multifold: to provide a principled way of avoiding
the necessity of judging others as guilty of MED, yet at the same time
holding each other responsible to the reasoning endeavor, so as to
include the epistemically reasonable, and also avoiding a theory of
disagreement, so as to sidestep the paradox of theories of disagreement. What we have to guide us is the Rawlsean strategy of seeking
an inclusive orientation, one, though, that is more inclusive than a
theory or ideal and more effective than the burdens of judgment.
The answer, I believe, is right before or in us – what we have been
doing throughout this essay, namely, engaging in the conversational
inquiry of philosophizing, where we seek to find out the best answer
we can come up with to issues that divide us in fundamental ways.
And what is this, I ask, but a practice that gives rise to and directs
the burdens of judgment and as such internally generates its own criteria – the C?15
Such a practice demands that we strive to meet the C: clarity, to
make clear what we are saying to ourselves and to each other; consistency, to not say here what denies what we said there; coherence, to
relate what we are saying here with what we say there so as
to provide an interconnected, not ad hoc, view; and completeness, to
omit nothing of importance from what we are saying. These criteria
are non-negotiable, since they arise out of the practice of conversational inquiry itself – as exemplified by the work of an Anscombe
to a Zeno. Others can and do of course back out of the inquiry, but
then, we who remain can point out to all that they have removed
15

For this concept of a practice I have been helped by Alasdair
MacIntyre’s After Virtue (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre
Dame Press, 1981), 175.
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themselves from the conversational inquiry and, while welcome to
return, are so only within its confines.
However, try as we may, we fail to meet the C, as seen even in my
delineation of the C themselves. As stated, they are not clear: I have
not pinned down what sufficient clarity is, what substantively
denies what was said – when we worry over a ‘foolish consistency’ –
what a disconnected claim is, and what is important. Nor are they
consistent insofar as consistency and coherence often conflict with
completeness. Nor are they coherent, for I have not delineated how
they relate to one another and in particular, how they are to be
ordered when they conflict. Nor are they complete, as I have
omitted such criteria as elegance, consilience, the various simplicities, and so on – let alone not offering the metaphysics and epistemology that could illuminate what sort of world and ‘knowing’ creature
would allow for such results; let alone not addressing a morally troubling incompleteness in the practice of reason itself as it too often
promotes a meritocracy of the clever that denigrates the disabled
among us.16 So it is that our practice of sustained conversational
inquiry illuminates why Coope is on the mark in doubting whether
we ‘understand enough about what it is to be rational’. For rationality
itself, as lived and practiced in the inquiry, raises such questions
about itself. In short, our reasons are questioned, in many and diverse
ways. These questions, moreover, lead to three epistemically crucial
consequences.
First, any full account of the C is in development: it requires a fully
developed perspective – a clear, consistent, coherent and complete
account of what amounts to substantive clarity, consistency, coherence and completeness. And that fully developed perspective is just
what we who are engaged in the inquiry are seeking, just what we
lack – a lack and the drive to fill it, as Plato’s Symposium illuminated,
that is the work of philosophizing in the on-going inquiry. Hence,
16

For a recent appreciation of the criterion of elegance, see Freeman
Dyson’s review of Graham Farmelo’s The Strangest Man: The Hidden
Life of Paul Dirac, Mystic of the Atom (Basic Books) in The New York
Review of Books LVII (2/25/2010), 20–23. For consilience, a specific application of completeness, see Elizabeth A. Lloyd, ‘The Nature of Darwin’s
Support for the Theory of Natural Selection’, in Philosophy of Science 50
(1983), 112–119 For a metaphysics that might begin to illuminate such indeterminacy of criteria see my ‘Mind-Body Continuism: Dualities with
Dualism’, The Journal of Speculative Philosophy 5 (1991), 233–255; and
see Stephen R.L. Clark’s ‘Deconstructing the Laws of Logic’, Philosophy
83 (2008), 25–53. For a discussion of the disabled, see Soran Reader, in
‘The Other Side of Agency, Philosophy 82 (October, 2007), 579–604.
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my – our – inability to fully define the C is no mere consequence of a
lack of time. Rather, it results from the inchoate nature of the inquiry
itself. Our practice of inquiry endeavors to meet the C by developing
our core beliefs – what Lakatos, in the more restricted sphere of philosophy of science, speaks of as our ‘hard core’ and what Coope, following Bas Van Frassen, speaks of as our ‘stance’.17 It is this work
to develop our core beliefs in the light of the C, that in turn reflects
on what the C are in a self-reflective interplay – back and forth,
between our core beliefs and the C – that allows us to organize our
burdens of judgment by, to hark back to Rawls’s list, directing us as
we sift through conflicting and complex evidence, weigh one piece
of evidence as opposed to another, and so on.
Second, when we work to fill this lack we find that we run up
against the unpredictability of the on-going inquiry: the more we
inquire, the more questions we find forced on our own perspective,
and the more plausible it then becomes that our inquiry will lead
us to radically alter our perspective. As seen in the fluid courses of
so many philosophers – from Plato and Aristotle to Augustine … to
Russell and Wittgenstein … to Rawls and Nozick, and so on –
further inquiry often results in surprises that sharply qualify to
upend one’s core beliefs. So Rawls himself was very much aware of
being part of a long-term endeavor to meet the C, as, to give just
one instance of many, he observed that TJ ‘barely mentions retributive justice and the protection of the environment … justice of and in
the family’ and so on. And while he believes a more developed view
can answer such questions, he grants that it ‘may prove defective’
(PL, xxix).
Third, there remains an uncertainty to the on-going inquiry.
Without ‘going post-modern’, there is an essaying forth, a trying
out, in our inquiries, where it’s not merely that the on-going
inquiry is unpredictable as to where it may end up; but also it is uncertain, even undetermined, as to how it came to be and where it is
now. Just what thinkers, from Plato to Rawls, are moved by in their
endeavors to meet the C stands as the main interpretative question
Imre Lakatos, ‘Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific
Research Programmes’, in Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, (eds),
Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1970), 133–134; Christopher Miles Coope, op. cit., note 14, 290. As
seen by such metaphors – ‘hard core’ and ‘stance’ – just what this fundamental
orientation is remains open to further inquiry. See also Joseph Aggasi, ‘The
Nature of Scientific Problems and their Roots in Metaphysics’, in Mario
Bunge (ed.), The Critical Approach (New York: Free Press, 1964), 189–211.
17
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in understanding any one of them. For instance, was Rawls seeking,
after the standard interpretation of him, a new basis for political
philosophy? – or, after Cohen, a basis for political philosophy that
those committed to a liberal democracy could accept? – or, after
Laden, a solution to the problem of faith commitments in a liberal
democracy? – or some convoluted swirl of these? As Rawls observed
of himself, ‘I don’t think I really know why I took the course I did.
Any story I would tell is likely to be fiction, merely what I want to
believe’ (PL, xxx).
8. Disagreement does not entail deficiency
What follows from this – a consequence of the nature of inquiry itself
being in development, unpredictable and uncertain, where our methodologies are questioned in many and diverse ways – is that it is not
necessarily because of someone’s deficiency, whether on us or on
them, that we disagree. Rather, we often don’t find any general agreement on what we take to be the right and good way to live together
just because we, all of us, have not yet met but are still seeking to
meet the C – a two-sided fact, one side of which we tend to state
very forcefully and negatively with respect to others, that they have
not met the C, and the other side of which we tend to state hopefully
and more positively with regard to ourselves, that we are seeking, are
on to the way to, meeting the C.18 Thus, my reply to Rawls’s question –
‘What goes wrong?’ – is to question the question itself. For no one
need go wrong in a reasoning endeavor that renders any final say
along the lines of a comprehensive doctrine too soon to say. One
may be tempted here to say that we are all deficient, but that
should be resisted. It should be resisted not only because it renders
18
This is not relativism in that the inquiry’s search for an independent
truth, the best view we can attain as defined by the C, is always governing our
inquiries It could be, of course, and this is the ironic contradiction of relativism, not that truth is relative, but that a relativism of a certain sort is true.
This backs Rawls’s rejection of Rorty’s relativism as too soon to say. As
Rawls writes, ‘It is natural to suppose that a necessary condition for objective moral truths is that there be sufficient agreement between the moral
conceptions affirmed in wide reflective equilibrium. . . . Whether this
supposition is correct, and whether sufficient agreement obtains, we need
not consider, since any such discussion would be premature’ (‘The
Independence of Moral Theory’, in Collected Papers, op. cit., note 8,
290). That is, a relativistic project is as much a matter of meeting the C as
any project.
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empty the term ‘deficiency’, but also because such disagreements are
all to the good, where we should be right now, given the on-going
nature of our inquiry as fluid, inchoate and convoluted – vague
terms, to be sure, but now further clarified by seeing inquiry as
being in development, unpredictable, and uncertain.
Replying to and appraising these joint inquiries is messy. Precisely
because the inquiry is philosophical it lacks sharp edges. But that the
edges are smudged does not erase the edges.19 We demand of each
other to be open to the inquiring conversation, to be responsive to
the criticisms and questions of others. We ask of each other how
our specific investigations aim to respond to the charges of a lack of
clarity, consistency, coherence, and completeness – as these criteria
emerge in the inquiry. We require of each other, in other words, a
strategy, as honest a plan as we can concoct in our convoluted attempts to meet the C by developing our specific core ideas. And we
can ask of each other to acknowledge that our ‘honest’ plan might
upend us into a radically different space. Raising such challenges is
what the practice of philosophy does.
The Confucian, Tu Weiming, helps me to see the way here. Like
Read, Tu criticizes the autonomous, self-legislating self of Rawlsean
liberalism. In Tu’s language, the Confucian ‘core values’ build on
an understanding of the self that is essentially relational – ‘a series of
concentric circles; self, family, community, society, nation, world,
and cosmos’.20 But Tu seeks to transcend what he calls a ‘confrontational strategy’ (300) (as found in a Read or Dreben) by understanding
his project as only a part of the global inquiry. He speaks of his project
as a ‘spiritual joint venture’(300), which I take to mean: spiritual, in
Astrology and its ilk erase the edges – in, say, astrology’s lack of clarity
and coherence (and interest!) as to what a simultaneous influence from the
stars could be, or in its lack of completeness (and interest!) in how to
account for the shift of the zodiac every two millennia. See my ‘On
Dismissing Astrology and Other Irrationalities’, in Patrick Grim (ed.),
Philosophy of Science and the Occult, (Albany, N.Y.: State University of
New York Press, 1982), 24–32.
20
Tu Weiming, ‘Epilogue: Human Rights as a Confucian Moral
Discourse’ in Wm. Theodore de Bary and Tu Weiming (eds),
Confucianism and Human Rights (New York: Columbia University Press,
1998), 302. All references to Tu will be to this essay. See also Robert
Cummings Neville, Boston Confucianism: Portable Tradition in the LateModern World (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press,
2000). For a more confrontational exponent of Confucianism see Henry J.
Rosemont, Jr., ‘Human Rights: A Bill of Worries’, in Confucianism and
Human Rights, 54–66.
19

438

http://journals.cambridge.org

Downloaded: 06 Jul 2012

IP address: 207.206.236.5

Too Soon to Say
being hopeful for as yet unseen and promising possibilities;21 joint, in
engaging in an inquiry with a number of diverse vantage points; and a
venture, in being open to uncharted territories and radical surprises.
Tu thus essays forth to enrich both Confucian and Enlightenment
ideals, where Confucian values can ‘help us to understand that
Enlightenment values do not necessarily cohere into an integrated
guide for action’, just as liberalism can help us to understand the
‘danger of using Confucian values as a cover for authoritarian practices’ (299). Consequently, Tu sees Confucian values as not only compatible with the implementation of human rights but also in fact
enhancing ‘the universal appeal of human rights’ (299). He does
not, in other words, aim to dismiss liberalism and replace it with a ‘nativistic’ Confucianism but to engage with liberalism in an on-going
competing-complementary conversational inquiry. What is to be
added – as Tu would insist (302) – is that this is an inquiry with a
much wider scope than that of Confucianism (or even communitarianism) vs. liberalism. We are engaged in a global joint inquiry that includes the perspectives and sub-perspectives of Islam, Daoism,
Vedanta, Buddhism, and on.
9. The Euthyphro? – yes-yes, too soon to say
Given the strictures of inquiry – that in seeking to meet the C our
quest is in development, unpredictable, and uncertain, and that
hence disagreement does not entail moral epistemic deficiency –
what follows is a generalized yes-yes solution to the Euthyphro.
This solution is yes-yes in that it gives a qualified ‘yes’ to both
main replies to the question. Our view is right because ‘the gods’
will it – meaning, because it is ours, embodying our deepest convictions, our core beliefs. And yet ‘the gods’ will it because it is right –
meaning, because we throughout aim to work within and to meet
the criteria of reason, the C. Moreover, the solution is generalized
in that it holds for all competing perspectives that are engaged in
the conversational inquiry. Hence, one’s reply to the Euthyphro
cannot be isolated from other and indeed multiple competing
replies to the Euthyphro: our specific solutions are justified only to
the extent that they are on-going and in collaborative critical exchange with each other. For it is precisely that sustained exchange
that grounds their rationality.
21

For reasons of space and unneeded specificity, this overly simplifies
Tu’s rich notion of the ‘unity of Heaven and humanity’ (302).
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This reply to the Euthyphro is a rational reconstruction of philosophical practice. As such it is both descriptive and prescriptive. It is
descriptive in claiming that this is what in fact we aim at in our inquiries, as evidenced by the history of philosophy and by our own
reasoning. It is prescriptive in claiming that to engage in inquiry
one should advance one’s own basic insights – hard core, stance –
and yet, paradoxically, with the full knowledge that they will not
and for now should not be taken as final – not as long as we are
seeking to meet the C through an embracive conversational inquiry
with the essential developmental unpredictability and uncertainty it
carries with it. Rather, our views are in the making, where it is too
soon to say what any one view is, let alone which one is the ‘last
one standing, the winner’.
This too-soon-to-say solution to the Euthyphro differs in aim from
Rawls’s two-step yes-yes solutions. While Rawls aims to keep the
conversation going among citizens, secular or sectarian, in a democracy, this solution aims to keep the inquiry going amidst our sharp
disagreements in philosophy, especially in political theory, in such
a way that we need not see each other as guilty of MED.22
Nonetheless, this too-soon-to-say solution to the Euthyphro
remains Rawlsean in its general aim to keep the inquiring conversation going among as many as possible. What it learns from Rawls,
however, is that to do this we need to be grounded in a base that is
wider in scope, includes more, than any specific theory or ideal –
which would only fall prey to the paradox of theories of disagreement.
To be so grounded we need to unearth the sources of disagreement by
seeing them as embedded in our practice of inquiry, our joint endeavor to meet the C – a ‘base’ that encompasses all those who engage in
an inquiry that opens itself to the reality of competing reasons.
This base situates and includes Rawls’s own bases – a theory of fairness, an ideal of reasonableness – and many others as well by placing
our primary commitment in the global philosophic conversation. It
explains, moreover, why it is that Rawls’s bases – his bootstraps –
are independent, as his citizens are encouraged to go their own way
to develop their bootstraps, their key commitments. To be sure,
this base excludes the epistemically unreasonable. But anything less
would exclude the epistemically reasonable and anything more
specific would exclude all those, reasonable and unreasonable alike,
22

I view this essay as a a step toward a notion of the citizen that provides
a way out of the current distrust that I discuss in ‘The Multivisions of
Multiculturalism’, Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Boston, MA,
August, 1998. http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/PoliJamehtm.
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who disagreed. No theory or freestanding ideal or specific interpretation of the burdens of judgment – or some theory of reasoning, such
as foundationalism or Wittgenstein’s Weltbild – could be as inclusive
as the inquiry itself, since any such specific theory or ideal would
exclude all those who rejected it, and any such theory or ideal
would have to be defended, argued for, within the inquiry itself.23
Consequently, this too-soon-to-say solution to the Euthyphro is not
unmoored by an independent bootstrap, simply because it includes all
bootstraps, independent or not, that stand committed to the embracive inquiry. For what could one say in response? – that one does
not aim for clarity, consistency, coherence, and completeness? – or
that one has attained full clarity, consistency, coherence, and completeness, such that one could not be wrong? The first response, if stated
as a bare assertion, would remove one from the inquiring conversation and into the confines of conversion. And if stated with reason,
it would move one into the problems facing the second response,
namely, both the heavy critiques of others and also the questions
one oneself could not (yet) answer – as witnessed by Anscombe’s
honest self-reflection, worthy of being repeated, that ‘rather generally, it must be good for anyone to think, “Perhaps in some way
I can’t see … perhaps I am hopelessly wrong in some essential
way”’.24 One could not take Anscombe’s claim to apply to the
inquiry itself, since her claim could arise only within the inquiry.
23

I am moved here by Peirce to take rationality to be motivated by our
‘social impulse’ – that we come to see that our mere conviction (tenacity) and
commitment to another (authority) and certainty in our own (a priori) insights are brought up short by the contrary beliefs of others. Charles
Sanders Peirce, ‘The Fixation of Belief’, in Philip P. Wiener (ed.), Values
in a Universe of Chance: Selected Writings of Charles Sanders Peirce
(1839–1914) (Garden City, New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1958).
By this social impulse, the epistemically reasonable would have a way of
appealing to the epistemically unreasonable. (See my ‘Going Astray:
Weakness, Perversity, or Evil?’, op. cit., note 2), where I argue that
Aristotle shows a way of conversing with the perverse. Whether our sociality
is prior to the C or vice versa is a crucial issue in its own right, which I have
no position on. See Joseph Agassi’s ‘Rationality and the Tu Quoque
Argument’, in Robert S. Cohen and Marx W. Wartofsky (eds.), Science
and Society: Studies in the Sociology of Science, Boston Studies in the
Philosophy of Science 65 (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing
Company, 1981). Agassi takes rationality to be embedded in our sociality,
‘really a part of our way of life, and that goes as well for the rationalist and
the irrationalist in our midst’ (475).
24
Op. cit., note 14, 262.
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The judgment that what we hold is too soon to say with finality, in
other words, arises within the inquiry, because of the inquiry, and
makes sense only within the inquiry. It does not hold for the
inquiry itself.25 Rather, what holds for the inquiry is built on its
core idea to appreciate how we diverse and odd people may see each
other as epistemic peers: we are engaged in a common endeavor that
transcends our specific perspectives by encompassing us all in the
bold and political practice of philosophizing – of developing our
respective emerging core ideas in the light of sharp but appreciative
critiques – a practice Rawls exemplified.26
Bridgewater State University
ejames@bridgew.edu

25

Inquiry may lead to its own self-restriction, for instance, in a Kantian
phenomenal/noumenal distinction, or in a mystic move to silence, as in
some versions of Abrahamic theism, Vedanta, Buddhism, Wittgenstein, or
the skeptic-inspired silence of Taoism. Yet all of these still employ the
inquiry – in Buddhist terms, seek to be ‘clever in means’– to attain the
proper orientation toward the noumenal, or the proper silence, concerning
which, of course, they disagree.
26
I wish to thank the Bridgewater State University Department of
Philosophy for encouragement and criticisms of this essay and related
essays in recent colloquia and the Senior Seminar – especially Professors
Matthew Dasti, Robert Fitzgibbons and Catherine Womack – and a graduate student, Michael Robillard. I also wish to thank two groups of colleagues
from my church, the ‘work group’ and the ‘affinity group’, for their grounding, critical insights and encouragement. The deficiencies of course, are
mine.
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